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Abstract
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensors are employed in various
locations in computer and communication networks to identify possible
malicious activities. One of the main challenges with IDS is the
high false positives rate, which creates a high unnecessary workload
for human analysts at Security Operation Centre (SOC). Similarly,
the exponential growth of captured sensor raw data combined with
the application of Threat Intelligence (TI) creates a complex data
flow. Considering mentioned challenges, this paper presents a model
of heterogeneous sensor and TI data fusion and reduction in intrusion
detection. We summarize found literature and qualitative research
interviews with security experts from law enforcement and public
and private organizations. Building on our qualitative research we
identified feature subsets for corresponding data fusion that produce
accurate classification model in Machine Learning (ML)-aided analysis.
Proposed data fusion process model was successfully evaluated on a real-
world dataset from a SOC. This work contributes to development of
data-driven approach for automated classification of IDS events using
reduction of raw log data.
1 Introduction
The number of security incidents worldwide is increasing and the security community
relies on the ability to detect and to react to such threats. Historically, information
security is a continuous cycle where vulnerabilities are discovered, exploited by
malicious actors, and patched by the information security community. As new
vulnerabilities and exploits are observed, signatures or patterns indicating malicious
activity are created. These signatures are used by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
to detect malicious activity in networks. The IDS create alarms for human analysts
for which to decide on what action to be taken. Unfortunately, many of these alarms
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are False Positive (FP), that is wrongly raised alarms. It has been observed that
up to 99% of the triggered alarms are FP [1], and finding the True Positives (TP),
correctly raised alarms, are labour-intensive. The high work load can lead to errors
and thus False Negatives (FN), that is misclassification of a correct raised alarm.
The work load of the human analyst can be decreased by aggregation and correlation
of alarms. However, this is not enough in a large scale Security Operation Centre
(SOC). The need for systems to reduce and streamline the process is present.
Applying Machine Learning (ML) approaches to event classification can provide
great benefits to the daily operation of a SOC [2]. However, several problems are
arising when considering the performance of the classification process. Blindly
applying ML to data will not result in desired performance in most cases, and
may only increase the computational complexity [3]. Furthermore, there is little
knowledge about which features are the most reliable, hence sufficient classifier
performance cannot be guaranteed. Also one can see that there is a knowledge gap
that requires up-to-date identification of relevant attacks indicators. Identifying
the most reliable and trustworthy features in aggregated and correlated data is
needed. In addition to this, these features may provide a more efficient way of
sharing information for situation awareness [4] and Threat Intelligence (TI). We
can see that there exist data-driven TI solutions like one provided by Sqrrl [5] and
corresponding governmental guidelines [6]. So, understanding the data is crucial to
ensure that chosen features provide the best problem-wise classification.
The contribution of the paper is two-folded. (i) Identification of requirements
for data fusion in intrusion detection based on relevant literature and research
interviews with security experts. A model for data fusion and reduction is also
proposed adhering to the specified requirements. (ii) An automated identification
of reliable and trustworthy features in correlated and aggregated intrusion detection
events for ML-aided classification. For this we performed data-driven experiments on
real-world data from the SOC of mnemonic. The remainder of paper is organized
as following. Section 2 introduces the concept of data fusion and TI as well as
importance of Feature Selection (FS) for information sharing. Further, Section
3 outlines our two-folded methodology that covers both requirements for data
fusion based research interviews with security experts and automated data reduction
method based on FS. A complete model structure is given in the end of the section.
Practical aspects of the experiments are described in the Section 4. Later, the
analysis of accordance between human expert interviews and data-driven approaches
is provided in Section 5 along with the ML-aided classification accuracy. The
conclusions can be found in Section 6.
2 Background
An overview of the state-of-the-art in data fusion in security operations is presented.
Next, state of-the-art in reliable FS is discussed.
Data fusion in Security Operation
In intrusion detection, a common problem is the high rate of FP. As a result,
there has been numerous work on decreasing the FP level as well as the general
level of alerts [7, 8, 9]. Nguyen et al. [2] identified current gaps in existing alert
management. Thereafter they proposed an efficient alert management approach
reducing unnecessary alerts from IDS. Their approach uses two modules: alert
verification module which validates alerts with vulnerability; aggregator module
which removes redundant alerts. The aggregator module reduces the volume of
alerts by aggregating alerts belonging to the same attack within a time window.
This is performed by sending alerts to predefined sub aggregator for each class of
attack. Each of these sub aggregators combines relevant alerts and create a meta
alert, efficiently reducing the volume of alerts. Their aggregation approach uses
simple fusion by fusing when all features are overlapping. In their experiment,
features IP, port, and time were used. The approach also allows for aggregation of
meta alerts. For evaluating the effectiveness, they used following measure:
reduction rate =
filtered alerts
total number of alerts
(1)
Based on their testbed with three different IDS, they achieved reduction rate
between 44.4% and 59.5% over five attack classes with an average of 50.39%.
Many other studies have focused on the FS process, and the measures used. The
earliest approach for FS in ML focused on filtering [10]. Work like Schlimmer [11]
and Almuallim and Dieterich [12] approached the problem by finding the minimal
combinations of features which are consistent with the training data. Other filtering
methods have been proposed in seminal work such as Kira and Rendell [13]. A
more recent work by Hall and Holmes [14] presents a benchmarking for several FS
methods. The performance of each method was assessed based on the classification
accuracy of two well-known classifiers Naive Bayes and C4.5.
Data-driven Threat Intelligence
When discussing state-of-the-art in data-driven TI, industry is where to look. In the
last few years, numerous companies and product lines have surfaced applying Big
Data technologies and mindsets to the classical security operation. The common
denominator of many of these product lines is that they focus on automation of
the process of combining TI and various internal data sources. Companies like
SQRRL [5], Recorded Future1, and Digital Shadows [4] apply data-driven
approaches for achieving situational awareness and for detection. More specifically,
they apply ML methods to unify a large amount of various data sources.
Reliable feature selection
To the authors’ knowledge, there has not been much work approaching the reliability
of the FS process. Nguyen et al. [15] performs an analysis of the main factors
affecting the reliability in FS: (i) choice of FS method and (ii) search strategies
for relevant features. A formal definition of a reliable FS process is given taking
into account the main factors analysed: (i) steadiness of the classifier, and (ii)
consistency of the search strategy. A method for addressing the main causes of low
reliability in FS is proposed as Generic Feature Selection (GeFS) measure. The
reliable FS process can then be seen as a maximisation problem finding of feat set
that maximises GeFS(x). This method is applied to two datasets, the ECML/PKDD
2007 dataset and a new CSIC 2010 dataset created by the authors. The first
dataset contains attack requests that are constructed blindly [15]. Therefore,
authors produce their own dataset generated from an e-commerce web application
achieving more than 90% accuracy of classification. Berg et al. [3] applied the GeFS
1 https://www.recordedfuture.com/
method to the problem of botnet malware detection. The authors conduct their
own experiments to construct a botnet malware dataset. Static and dynamical
approaches are used creating a dataset of 7,308 features. Data analysis shows that
many features are linearly correlated. Considering mentioned results, we can see
that the proposed GeFS greatly reduce the number of features while on average
increase the detection rate. Compared to similar FS methods, both the feature
reduction and average detection rate are better. There is, however, no comparison
of the steadiness and consistency of the resulting features in their work. As result
we believe that generally accepted and verified FS methods like GeFS can be used
for our purpose.
Information Sharing
The principle of information sharing has been applied in various fields ranging from
military sector to health sector. However, much of the approaches for information
sharing is proprietary, and methods and formats used is created on a per scenario.
The government of New South Wales (NSW) in Australia has published for guides
for information sharing between different entities [6]. The entities are government
agencies, non-government sector, research and public sectors. The guides are a part
of the NSW Government ICT Strategy. They are designed to help entities prepare,
manage and capture the benefits of information sharing. NSW government has also
created a framework for information management. The framework aims to support
the management and use of data and information for the government and contains a
set of standards, policies, guidelines, and procedures. It creates a common frame of
reference which supports the sharing and re-use of information by other entities.
These previous works by governments provide good guidelines for information
sharing, and they have identified the entities often performing information sharing.
However, a general approach, and may not be directly applicable to information
sharing in regards to TI.
3 Methodology
Below, the methodology for qualitative assessment of information sharing and
quantitative evaluation of ML-aided data fusion is given.
Research Interviews
Selecting interview as part of the methodology was done for several reasons. It
is, in information security, important to have communications between academia
and industry. The continuous process of research, implementation, application, and
feedback allows for new technology and techniques to be developed and used in the
current and future fight against cyber criminals. By interviewing security experts
in industry, feedback can be collected which then are used for further research.
It is important to state questions without limiting their response to ensure as
much information as possible is collected. Therefore, qualitative interview is best
fitting [16]. The interview was divided into three main parts; Information Sharing
discussed topics related to the sharing of information, focusing on sharing partners,
trust, and technologies; Threat Intelligence discussed topics related to what and
how intelligence was used in the organisations, how advanced current use was, as
well as the effect of such intelligence; Data Fusion discussed topics related to how
current fusion processes were designed, the potential requirements for such a system,
as well as how such processes can be designed more efficiently. The interview
subjects selected are from various fields of the information security community:
private organisations, public organisations, and legal enforcement. The group of
interview subjects consist of experts in both technical and operational positions. It
is important to note that the interviews were performed for information collection
purposes, and not statistical purposes. Questions were asked to understand the
current problems and solutions in information security industry.
Requirements for Data Fusion process model
Based on the corresponding literature and interview process, requirements for a
data fusion, reduction, and sharing process model is identified. By seeing the
advantages of previously proposed fusion process models, we seek to design a process
model decreasing or removing identified flaws. Further, by identifying how industry
performs fusion and sharing, combined with the current flaws in these approaches,
we seek to design a process model based on both academia and industry. The
following requirements have been identified:
Cyclic Ensuring that the model clearly describes a cyclic process is important.
The fusion process should be a continuous cycle to ensure situational awareness.
Detailed definitions According to Bedworth and O’Brien [17], a process model
should provide a sub-division of the problem which is rich and detailed enough to
allow reuse of specific knowledge. By breaking the problem into sub-problems, we
can create a set of problems which are easily solvable and implementable.
Automation Human analysts can only do so much, and including automation
for increasing efficiency as well as providing decision-support is imperative.
Automation in terms of sharing and inclusion of data allows for an efficient system
which is continuously up-to-date with the existing threat environment.
Sharing In the current fight against cyber criminals, the sharing of TI to trusted
external parties is important. According to Gartner [18], 60% of digital business
infrastructure will rely on TI to ensure operational resilience by 2019. The sharing
process should be a two-way flow which allows for the inclusion of new TI into the
fusion process. The standardisation of sharing is necessary to allow for automation.
Feedback As in most of the earlier proposed fusion models, an explicitly defined
feedback process must be included. A feedback flow should be at all levels of the
fusion model to ensure findings are used continuously to increase the quality of the
fusion process.
Concurrent processes The fusion processes should be concurrent. By having
concurrent fusion processes, we can enable independent and parallel operation, which
are critical in complex systems computing large amounts of data.
Intelligence-driven The model should include the acquisition, consumption,
analysis, and distribution of intelligence.
TI fusion from trusted external parties, considering that the quality of the TI
may vary. There may be overlap in the provided data, and fusion of TI from various
sources should be performed. The content and format of TI also vary depending on
the level of TI. Therefore, the fusion of TI is essential to increase awareness.
Centralised management With requirements for a cyclic process as well
as a feedback process, centralised management is preferred for managing this.
Centralised management is necessary with the increasing amount of sensors.
Distributed fusion With the increasing amount of sensors and log sources
we are approaching big data. Distributing the fusion process is necessary due to
problems related to big data, and especially important when designing for scalability.
Automated data reduction by feature selection
As mentioned before, FS can significantly reduce the dimensionality of data and,
therefore, speed of data processing. For data-driven approach, common feature
selection methods implemented in Weka were applied. These FS methods were
chosen because they are peer-reviewed and implemented in Weka [19, 20, 15, 21].
We applied the following methods:
InfoGain - calculates the information gained with the attribute with respect to
the class. Let H be Shannon entropy [22], c be class, and A be attribute. Information
gain can then be presented as IG(c, A) = Hc − (Hc|HA). This is a filter method,
and evaluates attributes in isolation from another.
Correlation-based Feature Selection (Cfs) - Correlation-based Feature Selection
method proposed by Hall [23] based on the idea that feature sets of high quality
contain features that are highly correlated with corresponding class.
ReliefF - ReliefF algorithm proposed by Kononenko [19, 24] which is an updated
version of the Relief algorithm proposed by Kira and Rendell [13]. ReliefF takes into
account attributes with strong dependencies and the distance between the examples.
To evaluate classification of the collected datasets, we decided to apply ML
methods implemented in Weka [25]. Our main goal was to use community-accepted
and peer-review methods that can be found in ML-related literature such as book
by Kononenko et al. [19]. More specifically, we used the following classifiers: C4.5
- a decision tree with pruning that avoid overfitting; K-NN - statistical learning
method that predicts a class based on the nearest distance from questioned data
sample to labelled one; Naive Bayes - a simple classifier that applies Bayes theorem
assuming that features are independent, Bayes Net - a probabilistic method that uses
conditional probabilities to build directed acyclic graph, Random Tree - a method
that delivers the best three based on a stochastic process, Random Forest - uses
a random set of features to build each of the random trees, SVM - one of the
most powerful classifiers that builds a most likely separation hyperplane between
the classes. To evaluate the performance of each classifier on each dataset, we used
classification accuracy measure defined as following: Acc = TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
. This
allows us to easily compare classifiers on the same dataset. Further, to avoid the
overfitting of the ML model and accuracy bias by convergence to a local extrema,
we used 10-fold cross-validation. This allowed us to evaluate the performance of the
mentioned classifiers on unseen data with desired properties.
Proposed model for information sharing
The proposed model shown in the Figure 1 is an attempt to adhere to the
previously defined requirements, and is a step towards full automation of data
fusion and information sharing in the financial sector. The components are: S1-
S3 - Sensors, T1-T3 - TI, Data Refinement - Sensors (L0), Data Refinement -
TI (L0), Object Refinement - Sensors (L1), Object Refinement - TI (L1), Object
database, Situation Refinement (L2), Threat Refinement (L3), Situational Database,
Predictive Analytics Database, Information Sharing, Process Refinement (L4).
Figure 1: Data fusion model
4 Experimental setup
The dataset acquisition and its properties are described below. In addition, we
present used hardware and software setup for the experiments.
IDS dataset acquisition
The acquisition of data is already performed by mnemonic as part of their Managed
Security Service (MSS). Using advanced data fusion techniques, events from various
IDSs and other information sources are aggregated and correlated. On average,
around 3 billion events a day are reduced to around 2.5 million alerts. These are
further aggregated and correlated for human analysts. Our dataset consist of 66,621
alerts over 60 days, which have been classified by analysts. There are in total 667
features and 10 classes as sketched in the Figure 2.
(a) Binary distribution (b) Malicious classes
Figure 2: Distribution dissferent classes in the dataset
The features are divided into the following domains (corresponding machine
labels for sharing are mentioned):
Exposure to malicious code Download of malicious code, or access
to a site hosting malicious code. When sharing data on such events, ele-
ments like domain, IP, malware classification, and source country is of inter-
est. destination.networkAddress.address, properties.domain, attackInfo.-
attackIdentifier, destination.geoLocation.countryCode.
Unauthorised Access or Intrusion Unauthorised users accessing system
either by benign methods or exploitation. This is a successful attempt of an attacker
actively avoiding implemented security measures to access unauthorised systems.
When sharing data on such events, elements like source IP, access technique, and
destination is of interest. source.networkAddress.address, destination.port,
and customerInfo.name.
Malicious code infection A malicious code infections that is verified. Activity
which indicates that the client or server is infected has been observed. Such
activity may be e.g CC traffic, port scan, or DoS traffic. When sharing
data on such events, elements like destination domain and IP, communication
channel and timestamp is of interest. destination.networkAddress.address,
properties.domain, destination.port, and timestamp.
Poor practice or policy violation Unsafe use of systems, or violation
of company policy. The use of technologies often associated with malicious
behaviour can be classified as this. E.g. use of TOR from company clients.
This can also be an activity which violates the policy defined by the company.
When sharing such events, elements like technology, communication channel,
and destination domain and IP is of interest. destination.port, protocol,
destination.networkAddress.address, and properties.domain.
Reconnaissance Activities often associated with reconnaissance activity
such as port scan and automated exploitation attempt. When sharing such
events, elements like technique, source IP, and destination domain and IP is
of interest. attackInfo.attackIdentifier, source.networkAddress.address,
destination.port, protocol, count, destination.networkAddress.address,
properties.domain.
Data leakage Information can be leaked either by an attacker actively ex-
ploiting a vulnerability in the target system, making the system return potential
sensitive information, or by target users performing actions which leak sensitive
information. When sharing such events, elements like organisation, destination in-
formation, source information and technologies is of interest. customerInfo.name,
destination.networkAddress.address, properties.domain, source.-
networkAddress.address, and protocol.
Suspected or confirmed targeted attack Such activity is often hard to
detect due to its low profile. Therefore, elements interesting for sharing is often
on a per case basis, however elements like organisation, techniques, technologies,
and source information is some of the interesting elements. customerInfo.name,
destination.port, attackInfo.attackIdentifier, source.port, protocol,
source.networkAddress.address, and properties.domain.
Failed authentication attempts can either be attributed to a wrong username
password combination, or to an attempt to access protected resources. When shar-
ing, elements like user information, source information, destination information and
technology is some of the interesting elements. properties.ad src user name,
source.networkAddress.address, and protocol.
Misconfigured device Activity related to devices functioning incorrectly.
Misconfigured devices can cause network problems by not operating as expected,
or by using more resources than it should. These types of events contain little
information that are interesting to share.
Adware can create vulnerabilities which can be exploited by attackers. When
sharing such events, elements like destination information and communication tech-
nique is of interest. destination.networkAddress.address, properties.domain,
destination.port, and protocol.
No incident is the most common type of events, as current security tools
produce large amounts of FP. Information regarding these types of events may be
interesting to share as part of a feedback loop if the TI has been collected from
external sources.
Experimental environment
This work was performed using two hardware platforms. Some preliminary testing
and visualisation were performed on MacBook Air 2015. In addition, the main
feature selection process and consecutive training and evaluation process were
performed using HP DL360. Corresponding software used in experiments are as
following. ML-aided analysis was performed using Weka 3.6. Pre-processing was
done by Python 3.5.1, Pandas 0.7.1, Scikit-learn 0.17, Pip 7.1.2 and Logstash 2.2.
5 Results & Analysis
The results of our proposed model are described below. Data-driven approach is
cross-validated using interview results.
ML-aided automated feature selection for classification
The classification performance is presented in the Table 1. For each dataset, we
have applied FS method and a classifier methods. We can see that on average the
CFS method provides the best result for all three datasets. It has been observed in
literature that feature sets generated using CFS equalled or bettered the accuracy
of using the full feature set [26], and our experimental results reflect this well. The
dataset was split into four stratified folds. Experiments marked with an * (asterisk)
have been performed on two stratified folds of the full dataset, i.e. 50% of the
dataset, while experiments marked with ** (two asterisks) have been performed on
one stratified fold of the full dataset, i.e. 25%.
Using features selected by FS methods (not shown here), we observe that number
of selected features is in range 5 - 9 features. Comparing these number against
the total number of features, n = 667, a significant increase in computational
performance is expected as well. When classifying security events for decision
support for analysts, it is of interest to perform this in real-time or near real-time;
thus, computational performance is important. Regarding classifier performance,
K-NN performed best on average with an accuracy of 93.22% with Random Forest
only 0.53% points behind with an accuracy of 92.69%. However, we should note that
of these only Random Forest had an increase in accuracy for all three datasets when
applying CFS feature set compared to the full feature set. The highest accuracy
for each dataset is in bold, while lowest is underlined. We can summarize that the
dataset has good quality features with reliable separation of classes (even though
Dataset Feature
Selec.
C4.5 K-NN Naive
Bayes
Bayes
Net
Random
Forest
Random
Tree
SVM Average
Original Full set *90.93% **91.96% *54.06% *67.78% *91.49% **89.07% **9.97% 70.75%
ReliefF *90.94% *91.43% *61.60% *74.41% *95.25% *93.88% *25.07% 76.08%
InfoGain *90.94% *93.05% *54.06% *67.87% *88.79% *93.26% **9.79% 58.12%
Cfs *91.59% *88.22% 85.84% *85.05% *91.72% *91.52% 10.59% 77.79%
Malicious Full set 92.00% 94.73% 78.80% 86.84% 93.91% *71.60% **48.20% 80.87%
ReliefF 91.84% 94.73% 73.61% 84.33% 94.53% 75.11% 37.50% 78.81%
InfoGain 91.97% 94.73% 78.80% 86.85% 92.19% 68.64% **48.12% 80.19%
Cfs 90.96% 94.60% 85.90% 88.33% 94.29% *84.30% **85.07% 89.06%
Binary Full set *88.70% *93.43% *91.23% *90.47% **91.11% **87.86% **84.96% 89.68%
ReliefF *83.29% *93.27% *92.41% *92.12% *95.00% **93.43% **82.57% 90.30%
InfoGain *88.72% *93.43% *91.08% *90.41% *89.43% *89.57% **85.37% 89.72%
Cfs *83.29% *95.03% *92.49% *93.49% *94.59% *94.66% *82.11% 90.81%
Average 89.60% 93.22% 78.32% 84.00% 92.69% 86.08% 50.78%
Table 1: Classification results
the dependencies might be non-linear), which made K-NN achieve the greatest
performance. At the same time such non-linearity causes SVM to deliver the worst
results, which can be explained by pure linear nature of this method.
Trustworthy features in aggregated security events
Research interviews have been performed with 7 security experts on topics
information sharing, TI, and data fusion resulting in 1-3 pages reports. Our key
findings in regards to what is of most value for information sharing: URI, IP,
Domains, Detection rules, Hashes, Malware samples, Methods, Tools, Procedure.
Since the CFS method produced best results on average, we will use those features
when comparing the selected feature. However, there are also elements which
analysts define as important in the decision-making that is not selected by the FS.
URI can be used for detection of activities like exploit kit landing pages and
callback. For an analyst, comparing two URI for determining whether the activity
is an exploit kit landing page is often easy. However, this is unfortunately tough
for ML classifiers without extracting features from the URI. Hence in our current
experiment, URI should provide little value. However, the feature normalizedURL
was selected by CFS on the binary dataset.
IP is often used for reputation purposes, and is a commonly shared indicator
according to interview process. Observing a specific IP can indicate malware
callback. Intuitively, the value of an IP feature should contribute little. However,
CFS on malicious dataset selected the destination.networkAddress.address
feature which is the destination IP. From this, we can deduct that certain IP were
observed several times as either malicious or benign, and trends were observed.
Domain can also be used for reputation purposes, and is also a commonly shared
indicator according to the interview process. Features related to domains were not
selected by CFS in our experiment. However, domain names have previously been
proved to contribute to detection of malware not only on reputation [27].
Detection rules Static and dynamic behavioural signatures like signatures
for Snort, Suricata or Yara are predefined detection methods. Sharing of such
signatures helps analysts avoid the time-consuming process where deep domain
knowledge is often necessary. A related feature was selected in our experiments,
namely attackInfo.attackIdentifier.
Hashes File hashes can be used for whitelisting or blacklisting of samples as
it creates a unique id for each sample. For automated detection and response,
such measures are simple but effective for low fruit malware. However, according
to security trend reports [28, 29] threat actors often modify samples to create new
unobserved hashes for each attack; therefore, hash is not as reliable as before. Such
a feature is of little use in automated classification using ML methods. Our data-
driven approach did not select features related to file hashes either.
Malware samples According to feedback from interviews, sharing of samples is
common. Participants appeared to be willing to share samples, and saw great value
in receiving such information. Features are extracted statistically and dynamically.
Methods, tools, and procedures Participants agreed on technical indicators
providing some value in the detection of malicious activity.
We see that few of the elements security experts consider relevant is selected
by the ML methods too. However, there are also some specific elements which
were selected by the ML methods that were not mentioned by the security
experts. Understanding the industry, sector, and residence country can provide
much information on the threat actor.
6 Discussions & Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed requirements for a data fusion process model
enabling automation in the security operation and information sharing based on
relevant literature. Further, we suggested a data fusion process model based on
requirements and research interview findings. Information security experts have
been interviewed in research interview process to be able to demonstrate the
difference between features selected by data-driven approach and features selected
by security experts. The proposed model defines how TI and sharing of TI should
be included in the data fusion process, and is, therefore, a contribution towards
the automation of information sharing and security operation. To the authors’
knowledge, no previous fusion process models incorporate TI in the way we have
proposed. We have shown that FS methods on aggregated IDS events increase the
performance of automated events classification notably. The dataset of aggregated
IDS events from real world networks; thus, we have demonstrated that ML classifier
methods yield good results when applied to real-world data.
Later on have identified two subproblems based on the problem of IDS
event classification and demonstrated how ML can solve these with acceptable
performance. For each subproblem, we identified the best performing FS method as
well as the best performing classifier method. More specifically, we have identified
the CFS method as best performing feature selection method. Further, we identified
K-NN and Random Forest as best performing classification methods. We have
achieved a classification accuracy of 93.88% on the original problem, and 94.73%
and 95.03% on the subproblems. This shows that ML can provide decision support
in SOC. In addition to this we observed while there are some common features,
there is a distinct difference between features selected by the data-driven approach
and features chosen by security experts. Finally, we believe that this works is a
contribution towards the much-needed automation in IDS event classification and
security operation. It was bridged the gap between academia and industry by
applying ML methods on real-world security events, and by performing research
interviews with security experts from information security community.
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